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Abstract 
 We employ probit regression analysis to compare the adult voting activity of students 
who participated in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) to their matched public 
school counterparts. We use a sophisticated matching algorithm to create a traditional public 
school student comparison group using data from the state-mandated evaluation of the MPCP. 
By the time the students are 19-26 years old, we do not find evidence that private school voucher 
students are more or less likely to vote in 2012 or 2016 than students educated in public schools. 
These results are robust to all models and are consistent for all subgroups. 
Keywords: school choice; private schooling; democratic education; political participation; 
civic education; school vouchers 
JEL Codes: I28, I20 
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I. Introduction 
President Donald Trump called for an expansion of private school choice through a $20 billion 
increase in federally-funded1 access to private schooling for each of the 11 million children 
living in poverty in 2017. Shortly after Trump was elected President of the United States, he 
appointed a supporter of private school choice, Betsy DeVos, as the Secretary of Education. 
During the same period, public interest in the idea of “school choice” reached an all-time high.2 
 Growing interest in the possibility of change in the nation’s education system comes with 
growing fears regarding what critics call the “privatization” of education. One of the most often 
cited fears, discussed since the inception of the common schooling movement in the United 
States, is that democratic society would not function properly without traditional public schools 
instilling children with a uniform set of civic values. The so-called father of traditional American 
public schooling, Horace Mann (1855), and others (Dewey 1916; Rush 1786), arguably helped 
convince the nation to expand government-run schooling in the 19th century. Today, some 
education scholars follow the beliefs of Mann, arguing that common schools are necessary to 
teach children from diverse backgrounds how to become proper citizens in a democracy 
(Gutmann, 1999). Other individuals, such as the President of the American Federation of 
Teachers, Randi Weingarten, claim3 that private school choice programs “undermine our 
democracy.” She, along with other school choice opponents, claim that self-interested schooling 
selections would segregate4 society by income and race while failing to teach citizenship skills.  
                                                     
1 Trump Budget Proposal Would Boost School Choice. U.S. News. https://www.usnews.com/news/national-
news/articles/2017-03-16/trump-budget-proposal-would-boost-school-choice 
2 School Choice. Google Trends. https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=school%20choice 
3 School vouchers don't just undermine public schools, they undermine our democracy. Los Angeles Times. 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-edelman-weingarten-school-vouchers-20170531-story.html 
4 AFT’s Randi Weingarten blasts school-choice reforms as ‘polite cousins of segregation.’ The Washington Times. 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jul/21/Randi-Weingarten-blasts-school-choice-segregation/ 
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 Likewise, people selecting their own schools may not choose institutions that specialize 
in shaping skills that accrue large benefits to third parties. In other words, self-interested 
customers of schooling may under-consume citizenship skills that have large positive 
externalities (Coase 1937; Pigou 1932). One citizen skill is to serve the rest of society by voting. 
An individual’s vote is not likely to change their own lives substantially, so they are not likely to 
gain much of a private benefit through high-quality civic education. In addition, individuals 
know that their single vote has around a zero percent chance of determining the outcome of an 
election, while it is costly for people to acquire the information necessary to make an educated 
and responsible voting decision (Somin 2016). Indeed, if voting activity is purely explained by 
weighing private costs and benefits, it would be considered irrational for most people to go to the 
voting booth on Election Day (Caplan 2011).  
 That people show up to vote at all is evidence that individuals consider the impacts their 
decision to participate democratically has on the rest of society. But how much do individual 
decisions take into account these types of positive externalities? Of course, if individual 
decisions do not consider all positive externalities associated with civic education, they may not 
perfectly choose schools that maximize democratic participation.  
In this study, we examine whether the private school choice program in Milwaukee alters 
voting behavior in the two most recent presidential elections. Since private schools have a 
financial incentive to shape character skills, and a previous study finds that the Milwaukee 
voucher program increases self-reports of planning to vote, we expect that actual voting activity 
will be higher for people that participated in the program than for those that attended traditional 
public schools, a hypothesis that runs contrary to prevailing democratic theory. 
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II. Theory 
Critics of private school choice programs have claimed that such a policy could negatively 
influence the foundations of a democratic society. Some education scholars argue that public 
schooling is required to inculcate a set of uniform citizenship skills that are necessary for a stable 
democratic society (Gutmann 1999; Apple & Beane 1995). That way, common schools could 
teach a diverse set of children to get along with one another and to respect authority figures 
(Mann, 1855). It is argued that without a uniform set of values taught through public schooling, a 
democratic society will not function properly (Saltman 2000; Molnar 2013). After all, if private 
schools do not focus on shaping a population that is obedient to the state, students may be more 
likely to break the law when they grow up. Further, if children are not forced to get along with 
others in common schools, they may grow up to be less tolerant of groups with whom they do 
not agree. 
 Alternatively, private school choice programs could promote civic values such as voter 
participation through increased educational quality, an improved match between educator and 
student (DeAngelis & Holmes Erickson 2018), and a higher likelihood of engaging in political 
discussions at school (DeAngelis 2017). Within the current system, traditional public schools 
hold a near monopoly on public resources. The monopoly power – exercised by the residentially-
assigned public schools – results in weak incentives to produce high-quality educational products 
at efficient costs (Hoxby 2007; Chubb & Moe 1988). Indeed, public officials have an incentive 
to maximize budgets (Niskanen 1971). If a public official spends less than the budgeted amount, 
they will be financially harmed the following year by receiving less funding. On the other hand, 
if the official spends as much as possible, he or she will be rewarded the following year in two 
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ways: (1) increased bargaining power for the need for more funding, and (2) the ability to gloat 
to constituents about all of the public resources they received. 
Additionally, the public finance monopoly results in a scenario where private schools 
must attempt to compete with a free good. Because of this severe power imbalance in the 
education sector, traditional public schools do not face substantial financial costs for low-
performance. Since civic skills are included in the quality of an educational experience, a power 
imbalance, such as the one that exists in the education system today, can result in a dysfunctional 
society. On the other hand, if the collection of individuals within a society values civic skills, 
they can seek out schools that inculcate these values within a system that allows for families to 
select their educational product (Friedman & Friedman 1990). 
Moreover, the power imbalance in the education sector teaches children that their 
individual efforts will not likely impact the overall process. For example, if a family does not 
like what is going on within a traditional public school, they can use the democratic process to 
voice their opinions. They could express their concerns through the voting booth and even 
parent-teacher groups (Kahlenberg & Janey 2016). However, if these types of democratic actions 
are largely unsuccessful in the K-12 educational experience, children may grow up to be less 
optimistic about the democratic system. As a result of learned helplessness, students may be less 
likely to engage in political activities as adults.5  
Lastly, private schools may have a stronger incentive to foster discussions about 
controversial subjects such as politics. If children are more likely to debate sensitive subjects in 
their K-12 experience, they will be more likely to care about politics as adults. If they find that 
they disagree with others on important political topics in the classroom, and they care about 
                                                     
5 Learned helplessness. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/learned-helplessness 
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public policy, they will have a robust incentive to go out and vote when they become adults. In 
addition, students and educators in private schools may be more open about discussing topics 
that would appear controversial in the public sphere. Since selection into and out of private 
schools is voluntary, and based on interests, students may feel more encouraged to discuss 
alternative viewpoints. On the other hand, students in a public setting may be more likely to fear 
insulting or offending teachers or other groups of students, so the controversial discussion may 
not happen at all (Berkman & Plutzer 2010). Moreover, traditional public schools are largely 
incentivized by standardized test scores, so their teachers would be completely rational if they 
did not focus too much on sensitive subjects such as politics. After all, it can be quite stressful 
focusing on provocative political topics, especially when the difficult discussions do not 
necessarily translate into the standardized math or reading test scores that are the basis for public 
school accountability. 
III. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 
The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) is the longest-standing private school 
voucher program in the United States. The MPCP began in 1990 as a voucher program highly-
targeted to disadvantaged families based on household income. At first, the MPCP was limited to 
1.5 percent of Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) enrollment, or about 500 students, and only 
seven non-religious private schools were allowed to participate (Witte 2000). In 1996, the 
program started to raise its enrollment cap until it was eventually eliminated in 2012. The MPCP 
grew steadily and, by the 2014-15 school year, enrolled about a quarter of all K-12 students in 
the city. 
In the baseline study year of 2006, the voucher was worth up to $6,501 per year, or about 
40 percent less than the average per pupil expenditure in Milwaukee public schools (Costrell 
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2009). To qualify for a voucher, applicants had to live in the city of Milwaukee, be entering 
grades K-12, and have a family income at or below 175 percent of the poverty level, an amount 
slightly below the ceiling to qualify for the federal lunch program.  
Starting in 2017, students coming from families at or below 300 percent of the poverty 
line – $73,800 for a family of four – were eligible for the program. Over 28,000 students and 121 
school participated in the program in 2017, and 75 percent of Milwaukee families were eligible 
for the program based on income.6 The maximum voucher value was $7,969 for grades 9-12 and 
$7,323 for grades K-8, or a little over half of what is available for children in traditional public 
schools. Schools participating in the program must admit eligible students at random, administer 
state standardized tests, allow students to opt out of religious activities, and employ teachers who 
have a teaching license or a bachelor’s degree. 
IV. Literature Review 
The evidence on the impacts of private school choice programs on student achievement is 
extensive. While the exact results depend on the specific program, the overall evidence indicates 
that private school choice programs have small positive impacts on student test scores. Shakeel, 
Anderson, and Wolf’s (2016) meta-analysis and systematic review of 19 experimental studies of 
voucher programs across the globe finds small positive impacts on student achievement overall. 
In particular, they find the largest effects for reading scores, publicly-funded programs, and 
programs located outside of the United States.  
Out of the 17 existing experimental studies on the impacts of U.S. voucher programs on 
student achievement, only two find negative effects (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2018; Dynarski et al. 
2017). Eleven of the 17 studies find positive impacts for some or all students (e.g. Cowen 2008; 
                                                     
6 Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. EdChoice. https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/programs/wisconsin-
milwaukee-parental-choice-program/ 
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Greene 2001; Wolf et al. 2013), while four find no effects (Bitler et al. 2013; Bettinger & Slonim 
2006; Krueger & Zhu 2004; Mills & Wolf 2017). In addition, voucher programs tend to produce 
test score effects that improve with time (Shakeel, Anderson, & Wolf 2016). For example, while 
the voucher programs in Louisiana and Indiana negatively affect student test scores in initial 
years, choice students catch up to their peers in public schools after three years (Mills & Wolf 
2017; Waddington & Berends 2017). Both of the experimental studies on the voucher program in 
Milwaukee find positive impacts (Greene, Peterson, & Du 1999; Rouse 1998), with the recent 
evaluation of the MPCP showing that the program improves student standardized math scores by 
11 points and reading scores by 6 points (Greene, Peterson, & Du 1999). 
 Although the evidence on test scores is quite robust, it appears not to align closely with 
the less extensive evidence on arguably more important long-term outcomes such as graduation 
rates, criminal activity, and income (Greene 2016). In fact, Hitt, McShane, and Wolf (2018) 
report that “there is a weak relationship between impacts on test scores and later attainment 
outcomes” for school choice programs in the United States. The state-mandated evaluations of 
the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) and the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 
find little or no student achievement gains alongside large increases in high school graduation 
(Cowen et al. 2013; Wolf et al. 2013) and crime reduction (DeAngelis & Wolf 2016). 
Additionally, the evaluation of the New York School Choice Scholarships Foundation (SCSF) 
finds modest student test score improvements alongside more substantial college enrollment 
gains (Chingos & Peterson 2015). This observed trend is not restricted to private school choice 
programs. At least six charter school studies have shown a nontrivial disconnect between short 
and long term outcomes (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2016; Angrist et al. 2016; Booker et al. 2014; 
Dobbie & Fryer 2016; Clark et al. 2015; Unterman et al. 2016). 
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 If short-run standardized test scores are not strong proxies for the outcomes that society 
actually cares about, it is important that researchers shift attention towards long-term outcomes. 
Overall, the evidence indicates that private school choice programs increase high school 
graduation (Cowen et al. 2013; Wolf et al. 2013), save the state and local school districts money 
(Costrell 2009; Scafidi 2012; Trivitt & DeAngelis 2016) and increase performance in public 
schools as a result of competitive effects (Egalite 2013; Egalite & Wolf 2016).  
The evidence on the impacts of private school choice programs on democratic society 
overall is quite scarce, but the abundance of the rigorous empirical studies indicates that private 
school choice improves civic outcomes. There are two reviews of the empirical evidence on how 
school choice impacts democratic outcomes such as citizenship skills, civic engagement, 
tolerance of others, and criminal activity. The most recent review (DeAngelis 2017) of the eleven 
quasi-experimental and experimental studies on the effects of private school choice on civic 
outcomes finds that effects are null to positive for tolerance (Campbell 2002; Fleming, Mitchell, 
& McNally 2014; Howell & Peterson 2006; Mills et al. 2016; Peterson & Campbell 2001; Wolf, 
Peterson, & West 2001), null to positive for civic engagement (Bettinger & Slonim 2006; 
Carlson, Chingos, & Campbell 2017; Fleming 2014; Fleming, Mitchell, & McNally 2014), and 
positive for crime reduction (DeAngelis & Wolf 2016). Patrick Wolf’s (2007) meta-analysis and 
review of 21 quantitative studies on the subject, in which he used a less stringent methodology 
screen than DeAngelis (2017), also finds that school choice largely improves civic outcomes. 
Twenty-two out of 23 findings from experimental or other statistically rigorous studies indicate 
that choice schools perform at par with, or better than, traditional public schools at shaping 
democratic outcomes. The same result emerges from less rigorous empirical studies as well; only 
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2 out of 36 findings indicate that traditional public schools have an advantage at improving civic 
skills. 
The only experiment examining the relationship between voucher participation and actual 
voting activity, set in New York City, does not find any impacts overall or for subgroups 
(Carlson, Chingos, & Campbell 2017). However, the previous study of the MPCP’s impact on 
voter activity, using data from the state-mandated evaluation of the program, finds moderately 
large positive effects. Specifically, the MPCP students have an 11-percentage point – or 20 
percent – higher likelihood of reporting that they would certainly vote in future elections than 
their matched public school peers (Fleming, Mitchell, & McNally 2014). If students are much 
more likely to report that they will vote in future elections while they are in the program, we 
should expect them to have higher voter participation as adults. Our current study is the first to 
rigorously assess the impacts of the Milwaukee voucher program on actual voting activity using 
student-level data. 
If actual voting activity does not reveal that voucher students actually engage in more 
political activity, as found in New York City, two possible explanations exist: (1) the previous 
study captures the voucher program’s ability to shape the skill of understanding social 
expectations but does not further motivate students to fulfill those expectations, or (2) the 
program actually shapes the skills necessary to boost civic participation but the effects fade out 
by the time the children become adults. 
IV. Data and Matching 
We use matched student-level data from the state-mandated evaluation of the MPCP. 
While schools participating in the program are required to admit students via lottery when they 
are oversubscribed, school leaders in Milwaukee typically recruit voucher students until they 
11 
 
have filled all of their seats. As a result, most school admissions do not require a lottery in 
Milwaukee. Consequently, we are highly restricted in our ability to experimentally study this 
voucher program (Cowen et al. 2013). 
 Instead, we used a sophisticated matching procedure in an attempt to replicate an 
experimental setting. Specifically, we generated comparable groups by using an algorithm that 
matched voucher (MPCP) students with Milwaukee Public School (MPS) students based on 
grade, neighborhood, race, gender, English Language Learner (ELL) status, and math and 
reading test scores (Witte et al. 2008). Researchers took the entire census of 801 MPCP students 
who were in 9th grade in the fall of 2006, along with a randomly-selected representative sample 
of 290 MPCP students in 8th grade during the same year, to organize a total MPCP student 
sample of 1091. Each MPCP student was matched to an MPS student in their exact grade and 
census tract, which define neighborhoods in Milwaukee. We further restricted matches to MPS 
students that were in the same 5 percent bandwidth of 2006 math and reading test scores. Finally, 
the specific MPS student that served as the match for each MPCP student was selected based on 
the nearest-neighbor propensity score calculated by student race, gender, ELL status, and test 
score. All but two students were successfully matched, so the final program sample consisted of 
1089 students exposed to the voucher program in 2006 and a matched group of 1089 similar 
comparison students in MPS in 2006, for a total sample of 2,178. 
The match on geographic location was essential since an appropriately common concern 
with any program evaluation is the fact that participants choose to receive treatment for 
unobservable reasons. Importantly, families that live in the same neighborhoods tend to share 
similar unmeasured background characteristics such as motivation level and morality that may 
have otherwise biased our examination of the MPCP (Ahlbrandt 2013). Previous research shows 
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that non-experimental matching designs which consider geographic location can come close to 
replicating gold-standard experimental results (Bifulco 2012). 
After students were matched, their parents were surveyed by telephone to gather 
important family background information such as family income, mother’s and father’s 
education, and whether both parents lived in the home. The telephone survey was administered 
by researchers at Westat’s survey call center in two waves – an initial wave in November-
December of 2006 and a follow-up wave limited to initial non-respondents in November-
December of 2007. The survey instrument, described in detail in Witte et al. (2008), drew upon 
questions asked of participants in previous school voucher evaluations in Milwaukee; New York 
City; Dayton, Ohio; and Washington, DC; with some refinements by the research team. A total 
of 69 percent of parents in both the MPCP and MPS samples eventually responded – a very high 
response rate for a telephone survey. The response rate for MPCP parents was 73 percent while 
the rate for MPS parents was 66 percent. In the analysis below, we use response weights to 
correct for any baseline differences. For our more complete model estimations we use this 
subsample of 1506 students whose parents were survey respondents so that we can control for 
family background characteristics that might otherwise bias our estimation of the voucher 
program effect on voting activity. 
 For our three dependent variables of interest, we searched publicly available voting 
records for each student from the state of Wisconsin. Specifically, we were able to find these 
records online at the My Vote Wisconsin7 website using the student’s name and date of birth. 
Over a three-day time period in December 2016, researchers who were blind to the treatment 
status of each student recorded whether or not the student was registered to vote, and whether or 
                                                     
7 My Vote Wisconsin. State of Wisconsin Elections Commission. https://myvote.wi.gov/en-us/MyVoterInfo 
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not they voted in the 2012 or 2016 elections. By 2012, the matched students were between 19 
and 22 years of age, and by 2016, they were between 23 and 26 years of age. 
 Table 1 below shows the observable differences between MPCP and MPS students after 
the baseline match. Overall, students differed on only one characteristic included in the 2006 
match. MPCP students averaged around a tenth of a standard deviation higher baseline reading 
score than their matched MPS students. Additionally, MPCP students were more likely to have a 
parent that frequently attended church and 4 percentage points more likely to have parents that 
completed college, indicating that MPCP students may have been a more-advantaged group. 
However, MPCP students were 13-percentage points less likely to be in the highest income 
group and 7-percentage points less likely to have a parent that graduated from high school, 
indicating that MPCP students may have been a less-advantaged group.  
Consequently, the direction of the selection bias, if it exists, is unclear. The MPCP 
students could have more-motivated parents, but they could also be those in most-need of an 
enhanced education. Nonetheless, we control for all of these characteristics in each of our 
analytical models. Table 1 also indicates no differences on the three measures of voter 
participation in 2012 or 2016. Table 2 includes descriptive statistics of each variable used in our 
models. 
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Table 1: Statistics on Model Covariates 
 MPCP in 2006 MPS in 2006 N 
Female 0.5676 0.5298 2178 
Black 0.6983 0.6966 2178 
Hispanic 0.1923 0.1760 2178 
Math in 2006       -0.0310 0.0396 2178 
Reading in 2006     0.1257** 0.0179 2178 
Income>50k 0.0473       0.1740*** 1401 
35k<Income<50k 0.1446 0.1392 1401 
25k<Income<35k     0.2135** 0.1498 1401 
Parent HS Grad 0.2566     0.3273** 1506 
Parent Some College 0.3502 0.3119 1506 
Parent Completed College   0.1643* 0.1245 1506 
Both Parents in HH 0.3485 0.3296 1502 
Parent Frequent Churchgoer       0.6399*** 0.5070 1500 
Registered in 2016 0.5236 0.5591 2170 
Voted in 2012 0.4782 0.4977 2170 
Voted in 2016 0.2410 0.2356 2170 
Notes:  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; All figures are the proportions of observations with the 
described characteristic except test scores, which are expressed in z-score units. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable              N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MPCP in 2006 2178 .50 .50 0 1 
9th Grade 2178 .74 .44 0 1 
Black 2178 .70 .46 0 1 
Hispanic 2178 .18 .39 0 1 
Female 2178 .55 .50 0 1 
Income>50 1401 .11 .31 0 1 
35<Income<50 1401 .14 .35 0 1 
25<Income<35 1401 .18 .39 0 1 
Parent HS Grad 1506 .29 .45 0 1 
Parent Some College 1506 .33 .47 0 1 
Parent Completed College 1506 .15 .35 0 1 
Math Z Score 2178 .00 .87 -3 3 
Read Z Score 2178 .07 .90 -3 2.5 
Both Parents in HH 1502 .34 .47 0 1 
Parent Frequent Churchgoer 1500 .58 .49 0 1 
Registered in 2016 2170 .54 .50 0 1 
Voted in 2012 2170 .49 .50 0 1 
Voted in 2016 2170 .24 .43 0 1 
Notes:  All figures are the proportions of observations with the described characteristic except test 
scores, which are expressed in z-score units. 
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VI. Methods 
Since our three dependent variables of interest are binary, we employ a probit regression model 
of the form: 
VoterActivityi = β0 + β1 MPCP06i + β2 Xi + β3 Zi + β4 test2006 + εi 
Our dependent variable of interest, VoterActivity, takes on the value of 1 if the student engaged 
in the voting activity in time period t and 0 otherwise. We perform a separate probit regression 
for each of our three outcome variables: whether the student was registered to vote in 2016, 
whether the student voted in 2012, and whether the student voted in 2016. 
Our binary explanatory variable of interest, MPCP06, takes on the value of 1 if a given 
student, i, was exposed to the voucher program at baseline and 0 otherwise. Students are 
classified as “exposed” to the program if they were enrolled in a private school using a voucher 
in the fall of 2006, regardless of where they attended school after that point. Fall of 2006 was the 
point at which the MPCP students were matched to MPS students. Using that point as a measure 
of “exposure” to the treatment of private schooling through a voucher renders our analysis 
similar to an “intent-to-treat” analysis in the context of an experiment, where subsequent student 
sorting is controlled for by being ignored. The outcomes for 2006 MPCP students who later 
switch to MPS or drop out of school altogether are averaged in with the outcomes for 2006 
MPCP students who stay in the voucher program through high school.  Similarly, the outcomes 
for 2006 MPS students who subsequently enroll in the MPCP or drop out of school entirely are 
averaged in with the outcomes for 2006 MPS students who stay in the public school district 
throughout high school. Essentially, we control for possible student self-selection bias through 
2006 through the matching protocol and then control for possible student self-selection bias after 
2006 through using exposure to MPCP in 2006 as our variable of interest.     
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Although we use a rigorous matching procedure that may be able to replicate 
experimental results (Bifulco 2012), we present models with parent and student-level controls. 
We include vector X of student-level controls and vector Z of parent-level controls. These 
include student grade, race, gender, churchgoing activity, parent income, parent education, and 
whether or not both parents lived in the household.  
We use robust standard errors in all probit models due to the heteroskedastic nature of 
models with binary dependent variables. We cluster robust standard errors by census tract since 
students within the same geographic region are similar on unobservable characteristics. We also 
employ linear probability models as robustness checks for our results. 
VII. Results 
Table 3 below presents our overall results for our two main models. Our results based on the 
entire matched sample with student-level controls can be found in columns one through three 
while the results based on the subsample with all student and parent-level controls can be found 
in columns three through six. 
 Overall, neither model indicates that voucher program participation is associated with 
more or less voting activity in 2012 or 2016. Our model that only uses student-level controls 
indicates that MPCP students were 4.6-percentage points less likely to be registered to vote in 
2016. Since the incidence rate of voter registration in 2016 was 50 percent, voucher students 
were 9.2-percent less likely to be registered to vote in 2016. However, this effect attenuates to 
zero in our model which includes all control variables. All statistical significance levels and 
estimates presented are robust to linear probability models with standard errors clustered at the 
census tract level. 
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 Control variables mostly behave as expected across models and outcomes. However, in 
our sample, black students were much more politically active than white students in 2012. In 
particular, black students were about 12-percentage points more likely to vote in 2012 than white 
students, perhaps because of the historically unique incumbent candidate for president. This 
result is not surprising, as United States voting data8 shows that the historically-high black 
turnout of 67 percent in 2012 had already dropped to 36 percent by 2014. This is equivalent to a 
24 percent higher likelihood of blacks in our sample voting in 2012 than whites. This large voter 
participation difference between races disappears to zero for the 2016 presidential election. 
Students of Hispanic descent were less likely to vote than white students, and females 
were more likely to vote than males in both elections. Remarkably, females were 12-percentage 
points more likely to vote than males in 2016, perhaps because citizens expected a female to be 
elected president for the first time in United States history. Relative to the incidence rate of only 
24 percent in 2016, this is an exceptionally large 50 percent higher likelihood of females voting 
in 2016 than males. 
Students with higher baseline reading scores and students with more-educated parents 
were more likely to vote. Students with more-educated parents were more likely to vote in 2012; 
however, this effect diminishes to zero by 2016, perhaps because individuals are less likely to be 
influenced by their parents by the time they reach 23 to 26 years of age. Alternatively, this result 
could be explained by the fact that Donald Trump garnered strong support from less-educated 
segments of the population.9 Unexpectedly, having a two-parent household did not relate to any 
voting outcome, conceivably because the variable is collinear with income and education.  
                                                     
8 Voter Turnout Demographics. United States Elections Project. http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-
turnout/demographics 
9 Behind Trump’s victory: Divisions by race, gender, education. Pew Research Center. 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education/ 
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Table 3: Effect of MPCP on Voter Activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Registered 
in 2016 
Voted in 
2012 
Voted in 
2016 
Registered 
in 2016 
Voted in 
2012 
Voted in 
2016 
       
MPCP 2006 -0.046* -0.028 0.001   -0.034 -0.021 0.005   
 (0.026) (0.205) (0.972)    (0.208) (0.484) (0.842)    
       
9th Grade -0.004 0.004 -0.035    -0.037 -0.032 -0.047    
 (0.852) (0.874) (0.105)    (0.173) (0.263) (0.068)    
       
Black 0.093** 0.128*** -0.038    0.079 0.102* -0.044    
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.180)    (0.052) (0.017) (0.257)    
       
Hispanic -0.105** -0.102** -0.076*   -0.123* -0.118* -0.062    
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.039)    (0.021) (0.023) (0.238)    
       
Female 0.167*** 0.173*** 0.123*** 0.169*** 0.183*** 0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
       
Math 0.003 0.011 0.004    0.025 0.019 0.010    
 (0.814) (0.508) (0.780)    (0.153) (0.308) (0.527)    
       
Reading 0.049** 0.038** 0.031*   0.044* 0.039* 0.034*   
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.017)    (0.018) (0.046) (0.041)    
       
High Income    0.040 0.050 0.051    
    (0.425) (0.313) (0.301)    
       
Mid Income    -0.056 -0.079 -0.010    
    (0.203) (0.078) (0.809)    
       
Low Income    -0.069 -0.078 -0.064    
    (0.088) (0.050) (0.089)    
       
HS Grad    0.156*** 0.134*** 0.052    
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.148)    
       
Some College    0.108** 0.124*** 0.029    
    (0.004) (0.001) (0.398)    
       
College    0.105* 0.118* 0.053    
    (0.026) (0.014) (0.301)    
       
Both Parents    0.007 0.013 -0.037    
    (0.821) (0.690) (0.236)    
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Church    0.011 -0.020 0.008    
    (0.657) (0.419) (0.742)    
       
Pseudo R2 0.0463 0.0506 0.0287 0.0716 0.0756 0.0361 
N 2170 2170 2170 1378 1378 1378 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered by census tract. Estimates are average marginal 
effects. Models 1 – 3 use student-level controls.  Models 4 – 6 use student and parent-level controls. All significance 
levels and coefficients are robust to linear probability models. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 4 below shows the results for various subgroups. These results largely mirror those 
for the overall sample. Subgroup analyses by race, gender, and baseline test scores do not detect 
any heterogeneous effects of the program on voting in either year. However, the model without 
parental controls finds that voucher students with below average math and reading baseline test 
scores were less likely to be registered to vote in 2016. Specifically, voucher students with 
below-average math or reading test scores were about 6.8-percentage points less likely to be 
registered to vote in 2016. 
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects of MPCP on Voter Activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Registered 
in 2016 
Voted in 
2012 
Voted in 
2016 
Registered 
in 2016 
Voted in 
2012 
Voted in 
2016 
       
White -0.061 -0.067 -0.022 -0.049 -0.042 -0.006 
 (0.127) (0.082) (0.499) (0.312) (0.420) (0.884) 
       
Black -0.038 -0.012 0.010 -0.027 -0.013 0.010 
 (0.628) (0.260) (0.405) (0.707) (0.639) (0.761) 
       
Female -0.053 -0.031 0.004 -0.06 -0.051 0.002 
 (0.711) (0.867) (0.763) (0.239) (0.160) (0.836) 
       
Male -0.037 -0.025 -0.006 -0.003 0.018 0.011 
 (0.219) (0.430) (0.845) (0.947) (0.680) (0.780) 
       
Low Reading -0.065* -0.047 0.014 -0.041 -0.021 0.030 
 (0.011) (0.064) (0.554) (0.217) (0.534) (0.294) 
       
Low Math -0.071** -0.039 0.006 -0.048 -0.024 0.012 
 (0.002) (0.109) (0.775) (0.092) (0.427) (0.649) 
       
Dropout Parent    -0.047 -0.001 -0.022 
    (0.784) (0.682) (0.542) 
       
Student Controls X X X X X X 
       
Parent Controls    X X X 
       
N 2170 2170 2170 1378 1378 1378 
Notes: P-values in parentheses. Robust standard errors clustered by census tract. Estimates are average marginal 
effects. Results in columns 1 – 3 include student controls, while columns 4 – 6 also include parental controls. * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
VIII. Discussion and Policy Implications 
While some scholars may suggest that these results conflict with the conclusions made by 
Fleming, Mitchell, and McNally (2014), we are not particularly surprised. There are two highly 
plausible explanations for the seemingly-contradictory results between the two studies. The other 
study simply asks these children if they believe that they are going to vote in the future. 
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Consequently, this survey question likely measures something other than political participation. 
In fact, it is much more likely that this question measures another arguably essential skill for 
social order: knowing what is implicitly and explicitly expected from the rest of society. It 
appears that the MPCP has a positive influence on that particular civic skill, but no effect on 
actual voting activity in 2012 or 2016. Alternatively, it may be that the positive impact on voting 
activity captured by Fleming, Mitchell, & McNally (2014) simply fades out by the time the 
students reach 19 to 26 years of age.  
  Our study largely mirrors the experimental results reported by Carlson, Chingos, & 
Campbell (2017) for the New York School Choice Scholarships Foundation Program: no impacts 
on voter activity overall or for any subgroups. Likewise, our study does not find evidence to 
suggest that access to private schooling through a voucher program diminishes the ability of a 
democratic society to function properly. Indeed, prior research finds that access to the MPCP 
results in an improved society through less criminal activity (DeAngelis & Wolf 2016), an 
understanding of the expectations of society (Fleming, Mitchell, & McNally 2016), more racial 
integration (Forster 2006; Fuller & Greiveldinger 2002; Fuller & Mitchell 2000), higher test 
scores (Greene, Peterson, & Du 1999), higher graduation rates (Cowen et al. 2013), and higher 
levels of college enrollment (Wolf, Witte, & Kisida 2018), without any social costs associated 
with diminished voting behavior. 
 Indeed, one could argue a finding that access to private schooling significantly effects 
voter participation, in either direction, would be cause for concern. If access to religious schools 
caused an increase in voting activity, there would be much anxiety about how those students 
ended up voting. If it caused a decrease in voting activity, concerns about a weakening of civic 
values would be strengthened. Since access to private schooling through the MPCP only appears 
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to benefit individuals through an enhanced education and the rest of society through improved 
social order, and has no discernable effect on civic participation, decision-makers should 
increase access to the program. 
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